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The Binational Dispute-Resolution Panel
Created by the United States-Canada
Free Trade Agreement:
What Did Canada Win?
Susan A. Maxsonf
In September of 1988, Congress approved the United States-
Canada Free Trade Agreement ("FTA"). The FTA abolished tar-
iffs between the United States and Canada, established rules for
bilateral trade in services, provided for trade in energy, and estab-
lished rules for governing bilateral investment activities.' Chapter
19 of the FTA created a system of optional dispute-resolution
panels for deciding antidumping and countervailing duty cases ap-
pealed from the Canadian Department of National Revenue, Cus-
toms and Excise ("DNR"), the Canadian Import Tribunal ("Tribu-
nal"), the U.S. International Trade Association .("ITA") and the
U.S. International Trade Commission ("ITC"). The panels replace
the review processes normally used by Canada and the United
States in trade litigation, and were established as a temporary
measure to be used while the two nations worked toward an agree-
ment on antidumping and countervailing duty laws.2
Although Canada hails the FTA's new dispute-resolution pro-
cess as an improvement over the U.S. system of judicial review, the
FTA provisions differ significantly from Canada's objectives as ex-
pressed on the eve of the FTA negotiations. Canada initially
sought exemption from U.S. antidumping and countervailing duty
laws or, in the alternative, participation in deciding cases arising
from them. Given the discrepancy between what Canada originally
sought and the provisions it finally won during the FTA negotia-
f B.A., 1986, The College of William and Mary; J.D. Candidate, 1991, The University
of Chicago.
I United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement, Hearing before the Subcommittee on
Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the Committee on the Judici-
ary, House of Representatives, 100th Cong, 2d Sess 7-9 (1988) (testimony of Alan F.
Holmer, Deputy U.S. Trade Representative) ("Hearing"). See, generally, Canada-United
States: Free Trade Agreement, in 27 International Legal Materials 293 (Mar 1988)
("ILM").
Free Trade Agreement, Ch 19, Art 1904, 1 1 and 2; Art 1906, in ILM at 387.
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tions, questions arise as to whether the provisions establishing the
binational panel accomplish what Canada initially desired, and, if
not, why Canada accepted them.
If Canada achieved its original goals, it did so accidentally.
The FTA's binational panel provisions respond to some of Can-
ada's minor concerns, such as the delay inherent to litigation in
U.S. courts, but they do not address the substantive criticism Can-
ada leveled at U.S. trade laws. Canada argues that the new system
will ensure fairness in the adjudication process, though prior to the
treaty negotiations it did not accuse the Court of International
Trade ("CIT"), the tribunal replaced by the Chapter 19 panel, of
bias. CIT decisions in fact do not evidence bias, though the Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which hears CIT appeals, tends
to rule consistently with the ITA and the ITC-entities that Ca-
nada asserts are biased. The only effect this new binational panel
might have on the outcomes of countervailing duty and antidump-
ing cases, therefore, is as a means of bypassing the Court of Ap-
peals for the Federal Circuit. This imaginable gain appears neither
to have been foreseen by Canada, nor to have been a basis for its
acceptance of the panel provisions.
Canada may have accepted these provisions because it needed
both to maintain good relations with the United States and to re-
port a "win" to the Canadian electorate. The binational panel pro-
visions enabled the Canadian government to claim immediate, al-
though artificial, gains, while leaving open the possibility of
continued negotiations with the United States about antidumping
and countervailing duty laws. The Canadian electorate may benefit
from Chapter 19 because it preserves the possibility of future nego-
tiations, but not because the binational panel is likely to apply
U.S. trade law differently than the CIT.
Part I of this Comment recounts Canada's objections to the
application of U.S. trade laws prior to the implementation of the
FTA, Canada's objectives in entering negotiations for a bilateral
trade agreement with the United States, the negotiation process
itself, and the resulting system of ad hoc binational panels. Part II
analyzes whether, from Canada's point of view, the new panels are
an improvement over the old system of judicial review. It first con-
siders whether Chapter 19 in fact addresses Canada's pre-FTA
criticism of U.S. trade law application, and then reviews post-FTA
assessments claiming that Canada benefits from the new dispute-
resolution provisions. Since supporters of Chapter 19 contend that
the panel provisions ensure greater fairness in the adjudication of
U.S. trade laws than existed prior to the FTA's implementation,
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Part II also examines CIT decisions to determine whether they ex-
hibit bias toward U.S. producers and industries.
Part III of this Comment suggests reasons why Canada might
have accepted the new panel system despite the fact that it will
not substantively change the application of U.S. trade laws.
I. THE CANADIAN AGENDA AND CHAPTER 19 OF THE FTA
A. The Administration of U.S. Trade Laws
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT")3 au-
thorizes member countries to create and implement legislation
designed to address unfair trade practices by other countries. Un-
fair trade practices include dumping-which occurs when a foreign
exporter sells goods in the importing country's market at a lower
price than in the exporter's home market-and implementing gov-
ernment subsidies designed to benefit a particular segment of an
exporting country's economy. The remedies for these practices
are, respectively, antidumping duties' and countervailing duties.
A U.S. producer claiming injury caused by dumping or foreign
subsidies petitions the ITC, an independent agency, and the ITA,
an arm of the Department of Commerce, for relief.' The ITA de-
termines whether the petitioner has alleged the elements necessary
for a finding that either dumping or countervailable subsidization
has occurred, and whether the complaint contains all the informa-
tion reasonably available to the petitioner.' If the petition meets
both of these conditions, the ITA begins to investigate the alleged
subsidy or dumping;"0 if not, the ITA dismisses the action."
The ITA next makes a preliminary finding as to whether a
countervailable subsidy or dumping exists. If it determines that an
unfair trade practice does exist, the ITA calculates the amount of
3 GATT is a multilateral trade organization that provides (1) rules for international
trade among its member nations, (2) a framework for trade negotiations aimed at reducing
barriers to trade, (3) procedures for resolving disputes, and (4) a mechanism for continuing
international consultation on trade policy issues. See Frank Stone, Canada, the GATT and
the International Trade System ix (Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1985).
Id at 35.
' Id.
o Stone, Canada, Gatt and International Trade at 36.
7 Id at 35.
8 19 USC §§ 1671a(b), 1673a(b) (1988). See also Alan M. Rugman and Andrew D.M.
Anderson, Administered Protection in America 13-14 (Croom Helm, 1987).
' 19 USC §8 1671a(c)(1), 1673a(c)(1) (1988).
10 19 USC §§ 1671a(c)(2), 1673a(c)(2) (1988).
11 19 USC 88 1671a(c)(3), 1673a(c)(3) (1988).
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net subsidy or price differential, orders the foreign entity benefit-
ting from the alleged subsidy or dumping to post a cash deposit or
bond, and orders the suspension of liquidation of all entries of
merchandise subject to the ruling and imported after the decision's
publication."
Concurrent with the ITA's preliminary determination, the
ITC makes a preliminary determination as to whether there is a
reasonable indication of material injury or threat thereof to a U.S.
industry, or material retardation of the establishment of a U.S. in-
dustry. 3 If this determination is negative, the U.S. terminates the
investigation. 14
Within 75 days of its preliminary determination, the ITA
makes a final determination as to whether a subsidy or price differ-
ential exists with respect to the investigated merchandise.1 5 If so,
the ITC must conduct a final investigation as to material injury.1 6
If both the ITA and ITC final determinations are positive, the
U.S. imposes antidumping and/or countervailing duties on the for-
eign party.17 But if either final determination is negative, the U.S.
terminates the investigation and refunds any cash deposit or bond
paid by the foreign entity. 8
A party to the litigation may appeal an ITA or ITC prelimi-
nary or final decision to the Court of International Trade.19 The
CIT will overrule a preliminary determination if it finds the agency
decision to have been "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion,
or otherwise not in accordance with law."'20 The CIT will also over-
rule a final determination "unsupported by substantial evidence on
the record, or otherwise not in accordance with law."'2 ' An overrul-
ing often takes the form of a remand for disposition consistent
" 19 USC §§ 1671b(b), 1671b(d), 1673b(b), 1673b(d) (1988).
"3 19 USC §§ 1671b(a), 1673b(a) (1988).
14 Id.
" 19 USC §§ 1671d(a), 1673d(a) (1988).
6 19 USC §§ 1671d(b), 1673d(b) (1988). Note that if the merchandise originates from a
country that is not a GATT signatory, the ITC need not find material injury in counter-
vailing duty actions in order for a duty to be imposed. See 19 USC §§ 1671 (1988), which
states the need for an ITC determination of material injury caused by the investigated im-
ports if a country under GATT or a member of such country provides a countervailable
subsidy to merchandise imported into the U.S.
",19 USC §§ 1671e, 1673e (1988).
18 19 USC §§ 1671d(c)(2), 1673d(c)(2) (1988).
19 USC §§ 1516a(a)(1)-(2) (1988).
20 19 USC § 1516a(b)(1)(A) (1988).
2 19 USC § 1516a(b)(1)(B) (1988).
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with the CIT's opinion.22 The Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit hears appeals from the CIT. Federal Circuit decisions are
appealed by petitioning the United States Supreme Court for
certiorari.23
Canada's system for deciding trade cases is similar to that of
the United States. A Canadian producer or industry complains to
the DNR,24 which makes a preliminary determination as to
whether goods imported into Canada are being dumped or subsi-
dized. " If this determination is affirmative, it levies provisional du-
ties.26 If the DNR is later satisfied that the evidence of dumping or
subsidy is conclusive, it issues a final determination that more ac-
curately specifies the margin of dumping or the amount of the
subsidy.2
7
The Tribunal, a body independent of the Canadian govern-
ment, determines whether the dumping or subsidization has
caused, or is likely to cause, material injury to Canadian produc-
ers.28 If the Tribunal finds injury, the DNR levies antidumping
and/or countervailing duties; if not, it refunds the provisional du-
ties.29 The findings of the Tribunal are said to be final and conclu-
sive, but actually may be reviewed by the Federal Court of Can-
ada.30 This court, however, may reverse decisions only where it
finds there has been a "denial of natural justice" or where the
DNR lacked jurisdiction.
B. The Canadian View of U.S. Trade Law
Canadian criticism of U.S. trade law falls within three catego-
ries: (1) criticism of the differential impact of antidumping and
countervailing duty laws on Canada as compared to the United
States, regardless of specific U.S. legislation; (2) criticism of U.S.
antidumping and countervailing duty legislation, including the
" 19 USC § 1516a(c)(3) (1988). For example, the CIT may agree with the ITA that a
countervailable subsidy exists, but find that the ITA miscalculated the amount of the duty.
In such a case, it will remand to the ITA for a recalculation consistent with the CIT opinion.
13 See Approving and Implementing the United States-Canada Free-Trade Agreement,
S Rep No 100-509, 100th Cong, 2d Sess 29 (1988).
24 Minister of Supply and Services, Canada, The Special Import Measures Act, repro-
duced in Hearing at 286, 288 (cited in note 1).
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Special Import Measures Act at 290.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Canadian Import Tribunal, reproduced in Hearing at 281, 285.
31 Id.
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ability of private U.S. citizens to initiate an unfair trading practice
investigation; and (3) criticism of the manner in which the U.S.
applies its trade laws.
Canadian concern over antidumping and countervailing duty
laws increased after the close of the Tokyo Round of GATT"2 for
two reasons. First, the GATT codes regarding dumping and subsi-
dies were rewritten during the Tokyo Round. 8 Second, the reduc-
tion of tariffs during the Tokyo Round increased the potential of
U.S. trade laws to be used as discriminatory trade devices3 4
Canada maintains that antidumping and countervailing duties
disproportionately adversely affect its economy. One source of this
concern is the GATT Subsidies Code's provision permitting partic-
ipating nations to apply countervailing duties to subsidized ex-
ports, but not to subsidized products that replace imports.3" Rod-
ney de C. Grey, Canada's trade ambassador to the Tokyo Round,
contends that the distinction between promoting exports and re-
placing imports benefits Japan, the nations in the European Eco-
nomic Community ("EEC") and the United States, because most
of them subsidize in order to replace imports. Canada, in contrast,
subsidizes export industries. 6 In addition, Grey maintains that
countervailing duty laws affect Canada and the United States dis-
proportionately because of the relative size of the two nations, and
that more Canadian than American programs are potentially
countervailable3 Canadian countervailing duty laws are therefore
only an "irritant" to the U.S., while U.S. law is a serious problem
for Canada.38
Canada also criticizes trade laws specific to the United States,
calling them barriers to trade instead of devices liberalizing
trade.3 9 In particular, shortly after the Tokyo round, Ambassador
" The Tokyo Round of multilateral trade negotiations, which took place from 1973 to
1979, resulted in new international codes and other agreements governing the use of
nontariff measures. See Stone, Canada, GATT and International Trade at 176 (cited in
note 3).
11 See Rodney de C. Grey, Trade Policy in the 1980s: An Agenda for Canadian-U.S.
Relations 17 (C.D. Howe Institute, 1981).
Id at 13. Grey maintains that the world has moved from a system in which domestic
producers are protected by tariffs to one in which they are protected by a system of "contin-
gent" protection, comprised in part of antidumping and countervailing duty laws.
11 Id at 56.
3' Grey, Trade Policy in the 1980s at 56.
37 Id.
11 Id at 57.
39 See Rugman & Anderson, Administered Protection at 9 (cited in note 8), in which
the authors maintain that antidumping and countervailing duty laws are part of a compli-
cated system of nontariff barriers to trade.
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Grey expressed concern that the threshold for establishing the re-
quired "material injury" might prove to be very low. 0 Canadians
further contend that American trade laws have been toughened so
as to replace gradually a tariff-focused system of protection with
an import regulation mechanism that vests in individual Ameri-
cans the right to relief from foreign competition." These critics
contend that granting standing to private parties results in more
antidumping and countervailing duty cases being brought in the
U.S. than in any other industrialized country, as well as a high per-
centage of preliminary determinations. adverse to foreign entities
being overturned in the final determination stage. 2 Yet another
Canadian criticism of U.S. trade law is that it does not require a
causal connection between the foreign subsidy and the alleged ma-
terial injury. 8 Critics describe this trait as both economically inef-
ficient and overly protectionist.4 '
Canada focuses most of its criticism on the application of U.S.
trade laws. Alan M. Rugman, who served on Canada's Interna-
tional Trade Advisory Committee during the FTA's negotiation
process, and Andrew D.M. Anderson most completely articulate
this criticism. They view the preliminary determination process as
overly protectionist, noting in a 1987 publication that since 1985
more than 90 percent of ITC preliminary rulings involving Canada
had been decided against it." According to Rugman and Anderson,
an affirmative preliminary determination hurts the foreign entity's
chances of ultimately prevailing because once the ITC finds mate-
rial injury in a preliminary finding, the foreign entity must pro-
duce additional information to negate the ITC's case.' 6 Arguing
that the application of U.S. trade laws is economically inefficient,
Rugman and Anderson call the ITC a "monster" created by pro-
tectionist lobbies in Congress. This monster, they contend, unsci-
4' Grey, Trade Policy in the 1980s at 57 (cited in note 33).
"' See Jock A. Finlayson, Canada, Congress and U.S. Foreign Economic Policy, in De-
nis Stairs and Gilbert R. Winham, eds, The Politics of Canada's Economic Relationship
with the United States 127, 142 (University of Toronto Press, 1985); Michael Hart, Trade
Remedy Law and the Canada-United States Trade Negotiations, in The United States!
Canada Free Trade Agreement: The Economic and Legal Implications 271, 274-75 (Ameri-
can Bar Association, 1988).
42 Hart, Trade Remedy Law at 279.
" Rugman & Anderson, Administered Protection at 43 (cited in note 8). See 19 USC
§§ 1671a(a) and 1673a(a)(1) (1988), imposing duties if an industry is materially injured by
reason of imports or sales. The statute does not require a causal connection between the
injury and the unfair trade practice.
See, for example, Rugman & Anderson, Administered Protection at 43.
Id at 25.
46 Id at 45.
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entifically applies economic terminology and criteria in its trade
investigations.4 7 Rugman and Anderson note that the ITC Com-
missioners are all political appointees-few with any business or
academic qualifications for the job-and argue that the investiga-
tion reports the ITC uses are superficial and the result of hasty
information gathering.48 They further contend that its procedural
aspects are biased against foreign producers, as tie votes are always
counted in favor of the U.S. industry. 9
Rugman and Anderson also criticize the ITA by asserting that
it (1) overstates the amount of the subsidy received by an industry
by totalling all provincial and federal subsidies, despite the fact
that provincial subsidies apply only to producers in that particular
province; (2) does not have clear legislative guidance in determin-
ing subsidies; (3). has been broadening the definition of subsidy
and narrowing the definition of general availability;50 and (4) does
not verify petitioners' standing to file on behalf of an industry. 1
Discussing pre-FTA trade law after the conclusion of the FTA
negotiations, Michael Hart criticizes the judicial review aspect of
U.S. trade law application, asserting that it prolongs investigations
and increases the uncertainty of final results.52 Hart further argues
that the American system is unstable because perennial domestic
pressures for protection from foreign competition translate into
frequent changes in regulatory interpretation and practice, and in
the U.S. trade statutes themselves.53
These criticisms of U.S. trade law and its application have
been aired in the Canadian daily press and in business magazines.
Rugman wrote on the subject before and during the FTA negotia-
tions,54 and Simon Reisman, the head of Canada's negotiating
" Rugman & Anderson, Administered Protection at 46-47.
"' Id at 44.
" Id at 45.
" To be countervailable, a subsidy must be directed to a specific industry and not gen-
erally available to all industries. 19 USC § 1671(a)(1) (1988) provides that a countervailing
duty is imposed if the exporting country "is providing ... a subsidy with respect to ... a
class or kind of merchandise." (Emphasis added).
" Rugman & Anderson, Administered Protection at 71-78. Michael Hart has also ex-
pressed similar views regarding lax procedures at the ITA and ITC level. See Hart, Trade
Remedy Law at 279 (cited in note 41).
5 Hart, Trade Remedy Law at 278.
" Id at 279.
" See, generally, Alan M. Rugman, Canada's Agenda for Bilateral Trade Negotiations,
Bus Q 37 (Spring 1986); Alan M. Rugman, Escaping Anarchy in Trade, Policy Options
Politiques 22 (Nov 1986); Alan M Rugman, Countervail Must Die with Trade Pact, Finan-
cial Post 8 (Mar 23, 1987); Alan M. Rugman, Regional Policy Requires Trade, Policy Op-
tions Politiques 40 (July-Aug 1987).
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team, publicly expressed his opinion that any trade agreement
with the United States would be worthless under existing U.S.
trade laws.55 Similarly, the Ottowa bureau chief for the Financial
Post wrote in March 1987 that countervail "is little more than a
U.S. nontariff gun, masquerading as legitimate trade remedy law,
and used mainly to harass foreign exporters and placate U.S. pro-
tectionists."56 Canadians, therefore, were aware that their negotiat-
ing team entered trade negotiations with the United States during
a period when their policymakers were highly critical of U.S.
dumping and countervailing duty laws.
C. The Negotiations Leading to the FTA
The United States and the Liberal Canadian government con-
ducted informal discussions relating to trade between the two
countries in 1983, but these discussions ceased in 1984 when the
Conservative party came into power in Canada. 7 In March 1985,
however, Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney and U.S. Pres-
ident Ronald Reagan held the "Shamrock Summit" in Quebec. At
the summit, both governments committed themselves to facilitat-
ing trade between the two nations, enhancing market access and
halting protectionism. 8
On September 16, 1985, the Report by the Royal Commission
on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada
("Macdonald Report") was released. Among other things, the Mac-
donald Report recommended that Canada negotiate and sign a free
trade agreement with the United States. 9 The report concluded
that for Canada to facilitate a restructuring of its high-cost, small-
scale manufacturing base in an effort to become world-competitive,
it had to eliminate tariffs and "make sure access to the giant and
affluent U.S. market . . . wouldn't be immediately frustrated by
aggressive and unpredictable use of U.S. trade laws against Cana-
dian competitors by American industries."6
'6 David Oxtoby, Free Trade Faces Greatest Hurdle, Financial Times of Canada 1
(Mar 23, 1987).
" Hyman Solomon, Inside Ottawa: The Mad, Mad World of U.S. Countervail, Finan-
cial Post 9 (Mar 30, 1987).
"7 Shelly P. Battram, Barriers to United States-Canada Trade Enhancement:
Problems and Prospects, in Lee H. Radebaugh and Earl H. Fry, eds, Canada/U.S. Free
Trade Agreement: An Assessment 25, 27 (Brigham Young University, 1986).
8 Id.
Id at 27-28.
00 Giles Gherson, The Talks: What Went Wrong, Financial Post 37 (Sept 28, 1987).
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In a climate shaped by the Macdonald Report, negotiations for
a Free Trade Agreement officially began on May 21, 1986. Simon
Reisman, who had been Canada's deputy minister of Finance in
the 1970s, headed Canada's negotiating team. 1 Peter Murphy, who
had just finished serving as the U.S. ambassador to GATT, headed
the American team.2
Canada's proposal to the United States included "national
treatment"'63 by each country of goods and services produced by
the other nation, the creation of a new dispute-settlement mecha-
nism, and the exemption of specific Canadian and U.S. subsidies
from each other's trade actions.6 4 Simon Reisman stated that im-
munity-from U.S. trade actions was his number one goal, and that
any agreement without it "would not be worth the powder it would
take to blow it to hell."65
Canada proposed the use of a binational panel to handle com-
plaints from aggrieved industries because, according to Trade Min-
ister and Canadian negotiator Pat Carney, such a mechanism
would have been tantamount to "the elimination of countervail by
both countries." '66 Alan Rugman envisioned a new joint commis-
sion, with equal membership from each country, that would ad-
minister trade policy between the two nations. The joint commis-
sion would replace the ITA, the ITC, the DNR and the Tribunal
for disputes arising between the U.S. and Canada. 7
The American negotiators did not receive these proposals
warmly. Peter Murphy indicated that the limited scope of his ne-
gotiating authority affected his ability to accept such a proposal,
and reminded Canada that the highly protectionist Congress still
had to approve any agreement reached by the two nations. 8
Because of this cold American response, Canada's objectives
changed somewhat. Rather than demanding both an exemption
from U.S. trade laws and a binational mechanism to settle trade
disputes, Canada began to argue only for the binational panel. In a
March 1987 article, Rugman stated that existing U.S. statutes
61 Id.
62 Id.
6 National treatment means that foreign producers are treated the same as domestic
producers under legislation and public policy. See Oxtoby, Free Trade, Financial Times at
10 (cited in note 55). Under national treatment, Canadian producers would not be subject to
trade laws that are not applied to U.S. producers.
64 Id.
" Id at 1.
6 Oxtoby, Free Trade, Financial Times at 10.
67 Rugman, Canada's Agenda, Bus Q at 38 (cited in note 54).
68 Oxtoby, Free Trade, Financial Times at 1.
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would not be abolished, or even amended, by the panel.6 9 He be-
lieved that if a new binational staff conducted the technical analy-
ses of trade disputes, the mechanism would be more aware of "the
social, cultural and political fabric of both nations" and would not
be "hostage to domestic U.S. pressure groups," but "would answer
to a binding international agreement.""' Rugman argued that the
new panel would permit Canada effectively to bypass the current
administration of U.S. trade laws, and that the prospects of reach-
ing agreement on the new panel process would be better than if
Canada continued to demand formal .exemption from U.S. trade
laws. " Rugman later acknowledged that while such a formal ex-
emption was the best alternative for Canada, it was not acceptable
to the U.S. Congress.2 As Giles Gherson of the Financial Post said
at the end of August 1987, "if the choice is between nothing and
half a loaf, Canadian private-sector pressure can be expected to
weigh in favor of a compromise.""7
Apart from the practical necessity of accepting this compro-
mise, the Canadians began to perceive the new panel mechanism
as essential to any trade agreement with the United States.7"4 As
stated by Solomon and Gherson of the Financial Post, with little
time left before the October 5 negotiation deadline, the talks "nar-
rowed to a dangerous, high-stakes game of chicken over the issue
of dispute settlement. 7 5
In mid-September 1987, the U.S. proposed a binational dis-
pute-resolution procedure without automatic or binding enforce-
ment.7 6 On September 23, the Canadian negotiators, backed by
Prime Minister Mulroney, protested that the U.S. proposal was
not good enough and walked out of the negotiations. 7 Negotiations
resumed shortly thereafter, and just before midnight on October 3,
1987, the two nations struck a compromise: a binding dispute-
'9 Rugman, Countervail Must Die, Financial Post at 8 (cited in note 54).
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Alan M. Rugman, Dispute System Needn't be Binding, Financial Post 41 (Sept 28,
1987).
71 Giles Gherson, Tribunal Plan Offers Free Trade Solution, Financial Post 1 (Aug 24,
1987).
"' See Hyman Solomon and Giles Gherson, Dispute Settlement Critical as Trade Talk
Deadline Nears, Financial Post 5 (Sept 14, 1987); William Mackness, Dispute Settlement
key to Free Trade, Financial Post 8 (July 19, 1986).
71 Solomon & Gherson, Dispute Settlement Critical, Financial Post at 5.
70 Id.
77 Susan F. Rasky, Cinadians Walk Out At U.S. Trade Talks, NY Times D1 (Sept 24,
1987).
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settlement mechanism for deciding dumping and countervailing
duty cases would be created, but it would replace the CIT and the
Canadian Federal Court rather than the institutions that initially
hear trade cases.78
D. The Binational Panel Created by the FTA
The FTA's final provisions concerning resolution of antidump-
ing and countervailing duty claims are somewhat different from
the provisions initially envisioned by Canada's negotiating team.
The Chapter 19 binational panel decides appeals from antidump-
ing and countervailing duty actions, rather than the initial claims.
Under Chapter 19, each nation chooses twenty-five individuals
to be on a roster of potential panelists. 79 The countries are to base
their choices on "objectivity, reliability, sound judgment, and gen-
eral familiarity with international trade law."80 With the exception
of judges, government officials cannot serve as panelists. 1 In trade
litigation between the U.S. and Canada, a party otherwise entitled
to seek judicial review of a final Tribunal, DNR, ITC or ITA deter-
mination has the option of requesting review by a Chapter 19
panel.8 2 If such a request is made, each country appoints two panel
members from the roster.8 The two countries then decide on the
fifth member; if they cannot agree, the four panel members already
selected choose the fifth; if the four panel members cannot reach a
consensus, the fifth member is chosen by lot.8 4 A majority of each
panel must be attorneys.8 5
Panels created by Chapter 19 apply the domestic law of the
importing country,88 and use the same standard of review as the
U.S. CIT and the Canadian Federal Court. 7 They examine the ad-
ministrative record solely to determine whether the lower agencies
correctly applied Canadian or U.S. law. Panel decisions are made
by majority vote, and must be accompanied by written opinions
71 Clyde A. Farnsworth, U.S. and Canada in Trade Accord, NY Times 1-3 (Oct 5,
1987).
7' Free Trade Agreement, Ch 19, Annex 1901.2, 1, in ILM at 393.
80 Id.
" See id, providing that candidates not be affiliated with either party to the FTA, but
stipulating that judges shall not be considered so affiliated.
" Free Trade Agreement, Ch 19, Art 1904, 1 and 5, in ILM at 387-88.
" Free Trade Agreement, Ch 19, Annex 1901.2, 2, in ILM at 393.
84 Free Trade Agreement, Ch 19, Annex 1901.2, 3, in ILM at 393.
81 Free Trade Agreement, Ch 19, Annex 1901.2, 1 2, in ILM at 393.
86 Free Trade Agreement, Ch 19, Art 1902, 1, in ILM at 386.
87 Free Trade Agreement, Ch 19, Art 1911, in ILM at 393 (definition of "standard of
review").
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explaining the determinations, along with any dissenting or con-
curring opinions.8
The FTA provides for an "extraordinary challenge procedure"
to be used when the United States or Canada alleges that a mem-
ber of the panel materially violated the rules of conduct, the panel
seriously departed from a fundamental rule of procedure, or the
panel manifestly exceeded its powers, authority or jurisdiction, and
this action materially affected the panel's decision and
"threaten[ed] the integrity of the panel review process."89 A special
committee of three, selected from a roster of current or former
U.S. and Canadian judges, hears extraordinary challenges.9 0 Other
than this extreme means of appeal, Chapter 19 panel decisions are
final and unreviewable9
One important difference between appeals to the CIT and ap-
peals to a Chapter 19 panel is that stringent deadlines are pre-
scribed for the formation of a panel and the rendering of a panel
determination. The entire process, from the filing of the appeal to
the decision by the panel, takes no longer than 315 days.2
II. EVIDENCE OF IMPROVEMENT?
Canada did not attain its goals, at least not as those goals were
articulated going into the FTA negotiation process. It neither re-
ceived exemptions from U.S. trade law nor instituted a binational
dispute mechanism to replace the ITC and the ITA. Some Cana-
dian commentators and politicians still maintain, however, that the
Chapter 19 panel is, in fact, a "win" for Canada.
A. Criticism of Pre-FTA U.S. Trade Law Application
As a starting point for determining whether the new panel
process is an improvement over judicial review from Canada's
viewpoint, it is useful to analyze the Chapter 19 procedures in the
context of Canadian criticism of U.S. trade law application.
Under the new procedures, U.S. trade law and the GATT Sub-
sidies Code still apply to actions initiated against the Canadian
government and Canadian exporters. Thus, Chapter 19 does not
allay Canada's concerns about the discriminatory effects of the
"8.Free Trade Agreement, Ch 19, Annex 1901.2, 5, in ILM at 393.
89 Free Trade Agreement, Ch 19, Art 1904, T 13, in ILM at 388-90.
• Free Trade Agreement, Ch 19, Annex 1904.13, 1 1, in ILM at 395.
' Free Trade Agreement, Ch 19, Art 1904, 11 in ILM at 388.
" Free Trade Agreement, Ch 19, Art 1904, 14, in ILM at 389.
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Subsidies Code and the disproportionate effects of countervailing
duty laws. It also does not address concerns that U.S. trade laws
are overly protectionist, as these laws will continue to apply.9 3 In-
stituting a complaint remains relatively easy for an American
citizen.
Similarly, the new system does not address the concerns
voiced by Rugman and Anderson about ITC and ITA application
of U.S. trade laws. 4 The panels continue to apply U.S. trade laws,
do not change the procedures at the agency level, and defer to
agency decisions. The "political monster" attacked by Rugman and
Anderson is still alive and well; the only casualty is the CIT, which
had not been accused of inefficiency or bias prior to the conclusion
of the FTA negotiations. The Chapter 19 panel hears appeals only
from final determinations, so the number of affirmative prelimi-
nary determinations denounced as "protectionist" will probably
not be affected. In addition, there is no reason to believe that the
ITC will apply economic criteria in a more scientific manner as a
result of Chapter 19, and it will still be composed of political ap-
pointees. In sum, the FTA makes no direct changes to ITA or ITC
application of trade law. The only criticism directly addressed by
the new system is the problem of delay. While the timetable for
ITA and ITC decisions has not changed, the FTA imposes strict
time constraints on the panel that were not imposed on the CIT. 5
B. Post-FTA Contentions
Rugman argues that Chapter 19 is an improvement over the
U.S. system of judicial review. He maintains that the mere exis-
tence of the panel provisions will deter frivolous U.S. complaints,
and that the mechanism will influence, and potentially reverse,
"the questionable investigative practices" of the ITA and ITC.96
Furthermore, he argues, the binational panel will probe more
deeply into the economic aspects of the ITA and ITC determina-
tions."7 His position suggests that the FTA results in three im-
provements over the U.S. system of judicial review: first, a sub-
" The FTA, however, addresses the problem of future U.S. trade legislation being po-
tentially more protectionist. A consultation occurs under the Agreement when one nation
proposes trade legislation that will affect the other one. See Free Trade Agreement, Ch 19,
Art 1903, in ILM at 387.
, See text accompanying notes 45-51.
' See Free Trade Agreement, Ch 19, Art 1904, 14, in ILM at 389.
" Alan R. Rugman, A Canadian Perspective on U.S. Administered Protection and the
Free Trade Agreement, 40 Me L Rev 305, 321 (1988).
" Id at 321-22.
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stantive decrease in the level of bias; second, a perception of
greater fairness, regardless of whether the binational panel will be
less biased than the CIT; and third, greater economic expertise on
the part of the panel, resulting in more reversals of questionable
ITA and ITC decisions. Other advantages asserted by supporters
of the binational mechanism are an improvement in the continuity
and predictability of outcomes, and a decrease in the time and
money spent on litigation.
1. A Fairer System of Dispute-Adjudication.
The most significant improvement alleged to result from the
Chapter 19 panels is a decline in political influences on the appli-
cation of U.S. trade law. In a speech before the Canadian House of
Commons Legislative Committee, Prime Minister Mulroney
claimed that "most significant of all [the FTA measures] are the
dispute settlement provisions which ensure that Canadian export-
ers are less vulnerable to arbitrary interpretation or capricious ap-
plication of U.S. trade law.""" Other Canadians contend that the
Chapter 19 panel will be more objective and less sensitive to politi-
cal influence than the CIT, but have not specified how the
CIT-an Article III court-is subject to such influence. 99
One view asserts that disputes arising under the new proce-
dure will probably occur in areas where national laws and GATT
rules need clarification, resulting in a body of case law being devel-
oped by the panels.'00 At first, this contention does not appear to
assert bias on the part of the CIT. The judges sitting on the CIT,
however, are supposed to be independent of the federal govern-
ment; their clarification of trade laws, therefore, should not differ
from those of an unbiased panel representing both nations, unless
the CIT actually is biased in favor of U.S. producers. Thus, the
most important gains proclaimed by Canada ,appear to hinge on
the hypothesis that the CIT favors domestic over foreign
producers.
08 Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, Free Trade Has Already Made Us Surer Than
Ever of Our Canadian Identity and Prosperity (excerpts from speech before the House of
Commons Legislative Committee on Bill C-130, Aug 30, 1988), in Canadian Speeches 23, 26
(Supp Aug/Sept 1988).
"g Rodrigue Tremblay, 250 Economists Say It's Our Best Option (evidence before the
House of Commons Legislative Committee on Bill C-130, July 26, 1988), in Canadian
Speeches 5, 6 (Supp Aug/Sept 1988); Rugman, 40 Me L Rev at 323.
'00 Jeffrey J. Schott, The Free Trade Agreement: A U.S. Assessment, in Jeffrey J.
Schott and Murray G. Smith, eds, The Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement: The
Global Impact 1, 28 (Institute for International Economics, 1988).
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Critics of the FTA question whether the CIT is in fact biased
and, consequently, whether advantages exist for Canada under the
FTA.10 1 A study of CIT decisions would support an allegation of
bias if it concluded that a substantial percentage of CIT decisions
favor American over foreign producers. Such a finding would lend
credence to the claim that the binational panel will substantively
change the result of U.S.-Canadian countervailing duty and an-
tidumping litigation.
Table 1 presents data compiled from CIT cases addressing an-
tidumping and countervailing duty actions brought by American
producers between 1984 and 1989. It shows the percentages of ITA
and ITC determinations appealed by American appellants to the
CIT and decided against the administering agencies for each year;
it also shows the percentages of appeals brought by foreign parties
and decided against the agencies. The table does not include the
corresponding percentages for CIT decisions favoring the ITA or
ITC over an appellant. 10 2
This data indicates no bias on the part of the CIT in deciding
appeals of ITA decisions. CIT decisions favored domestic over for-
eign producers for three of six years-1986, 1987, and 1988; com-
bined data for the six-year period indicates that actions appealed
by domestic producers were changed on appeal no more than those
brought by foreign producers.
Different results are evident, however, when examining ap-
peals of ITC determinations. A greater percentage of appeals were
decided against the ITC when brought by domestic, rather than by
foreign, producers for each of the six years examined. Over the six-
year period, the CIT decided 56 percent of the ITC decisions ap-
pealed by domestic entities for the appellant, whereas it reversed
only 26 percent of the ITC decisions appealed by foreign appel-
lants. Combining the data on ITA and ITC determinations, the
CIT decided domestic appeals of agency decisions in favor of the
'0' See Michael Howlett, The Threat of U.S. Protectionism and the U.S.-Canada Free
Trade Agreement Reconsidered: The Questionable Precedent of the 1986 Softwood Lumber
Case, 12 World Competition 65 (June 1989); David P. Cluchey, Dispute Resolution Provi-
sions of the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, 40 Me L Rev 335 (1988); Robert
E. Hudec, Comments, in Schott & Smith, The Global Impact at 87.
,02 If the ITA and the ITC are biased, deference to those agencies will result in more
appealed decisions favoring domestic over foreign producers. Such will be the case whether
the CIT or a binational panel is reviewing those cases. For this reason, the percentages are
calculated by separating those cases appealed by domestic parties from those appealed by
foreign parties, and determining what percentage of each was decided by the CIT counter to
the agency decision.
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TABLE 1
Percentage of ITA and ITC Determinations
Changed on Appeal to the CIT (1984-1989)" o3
ITA ITC TOTAL
Year Domestica Foreignb Domestica Foreignb Domestica Foreignb
1984 11% 67% 25% 0% 15% 44%
1985 38 50 75 0 56 43
1986 50 29 50 0 50 21
1987 41 40 33 25 39 38
1988 44 41 67 33 53 39
1989 22 26 50 38 27 30
Percentage of Appealed Determinations
Changed by the CIT, 1984-1989
Total: 37% 37% 56% 26% 43% 34%
a = Percentage of decisions appealed by domestic parties changed by the
CIT.
b = Percentage of decisions appealed by foreign parties changed by the
CIT.
103 This table reflects 257 instances in which a decision of the ITA or ITC was ques-
tioned by a domestic or foreign producer, 185 of which were appeals from the ITA, and 72 of
which were appeals from the ITC. This Comment looks at those decisions that effectively
changed or affirmed either the ITA's findings of dumping or countervailable subsidies, or
the ITC's findings regarding material injury or threat thereof. For example, a motion to
dismiss that was denied was not included in the calculations unless judgment was also made
on the agency record, as the issue of whether or not the lower agency's determination was
correct remained before the CIT. A motion to dismiss that was granted, however, was
counted as an action decided against the appellant.
Numerous cases involving antidumping or countervailing duty actions were not in-
cluded in the calculations, such as motions for preliminary injunctions, motions for attor-
ney's fees, motions to amend complaints, motions to strike, and so forth. Cases where the
U.S. government entity admitted to a miscalculation and also requested a remand also were
not included, unless an additional issue opposed by the ITA or the ITC was decided.
CIT decisions involving both ITA and ITC determinations were counted twice-once
for each agency. Challenges of ITA decisions involving both dumping and countervailable
subsidies were also counted twice, as findings had to be made on two separate issues and did
not have to both favor or disfavor the ITA. ITC decisions involving both dumping and
countervailable subsidies, however, were only counted once where the same import was at
issue, as the identical issue of whether the import was causing or threatening to cause mate-
rial injury to the domestic producer existed regardless of whether dumping or subsidization
was alleged. Cross-motions that also challenged ITA or ITC decisions, such as cross-motions
by defendant-intervenors, were counted in addition to the initial appeal.
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appellants 43 percent of the time, and appeals by foreign produc-
ers in favor of the appellants 34 percent of the time during the
1984-1989 period.
Given that no bias is apparent in looking at ITA decisions,
however, these results do not necessarily reflect a bias against for-
eign producers or suggest that the CIT is subject to political influ-
ence. Instead, the results may reflect a disagreement between the
ITC and the CIT regarding which criteria are necessary to issue a
preliminary determination of material injury. The CIT typically
requires a much lower threshold of injury than the ITC, and has
repeatedly told the ITC not to consider whether there is causation
between the unfair trade practice and the injury.0 4
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit explicitly re-
jected this view in American Lamb Co. v United States,"e5 in
which it held that the ITC had, in fact, been applying the proper
criteria in making preliminary determinations.0 6 Even after Amer-
ican Lamb, however, the CIT has exhibited a propensity toward
remanding preliminary determinations in favor of domestic pro-
ducers. Table 2, which presents the same data as Table 1, but for
preliminary determinations only, illustrates this propensity. Note,
however, that the Chapter 19 panel hears appeals only from final
determinations; the CIT's tendency to rule in favor of domestic in-
dustries in this particular context therefore will not be addressed
by the Chapter 19 panel.
While examining all antidumping and countervailing duty
cases indicates whether bias exists on the part of the CIT, looking
only at final determinations more accurately indicates whether the
Chapter 19 panel will change the application of U.S. trade laws.
104 See, for example, Republic Steel Corp v United States, 8 CIT 29, 591 F Supp 640
(1984), overruling recognized by Jeannette Sheet Glass Corp v United States, 11 CIT 10,
654 F Supp 179 (1987); Republic Steel Corp v United States, 9 CIT 100 (1985), disapproved
of by American Lamb Co. v United States, 785 F2d 994 (Fed Cir 1986); Jeannette Sheet
Glass Corp v United States, 9 CIT 154, 607 F Supp 123 (1985); American Lamb Co. v
United States, 9 CIT 260, 611 F Supp 979, cause remanded by American Lamb Co. v
United States, 785 F2d 994 (Fed Cir 1986); American Grape Growers Alliance for Fair
Trade v United States, 9 CIT 396, 615 F Supp 603 (1985); Armstrong Rubber Co. v United
States, 9 CIT 403, 614 F Supp 1252 (1985). In Republic Steel, the CIT remanded a negative
preliminary ITC determination. On remand, the ITC abided by its prior finding of no mate-
rial injury. On appeal the CIT reversed again, stating that "Itlhe Court's opinion on the
existence of a low threshold is consistent with its opinion that, at the preliminary stage, the
ITC should accept the subsidy allegations as contained in the petition." Republic Steel, 9
CIT at 102.
0B 785 F2d 994 (Fed Cir 1986).
300 Id at 1001.
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TABLE 2
Percentage of ITA and ITC Preliminary
Determinations Changed on Appeal to the CIT (1984-1989)10 7
ITA ITC TOTAL
Year Domestica Foreignb Domestica Foreignb Domestica Foreignb
1984 100% ND 100% ND 100% ND
1985 ND ND 100 ND 100 ND
1986 ND ND 100 ND 100 ND
1987 ND ND 33 ND 33 ND
1988 100 ND 100 ND 100 ND
1989 0 ND ND 0 0 0
Percentage of Appealed Determinations
Changed by the CIT, 1984-1989
Total: 67% ND 85% 0 81% 0%
a _ Percentage of decisions appealed by domestic parties changed by the
CIT.
b = Percentage of decisions appealed by foreign parties changed by the
CIT.
ND = No data; no cases appealed in this category.
Table 3 presents data for final determinations only, in effect ex-
cluding those observations represented in Table 2.
As Table 3 shows, little distinction exists between CIT treat-
ment of final determinations appealed by domestic producers, and
final determinations appealed by foreign producers. While the CIT
tends to rule for domestic producers in cases appealed from the
ITC, the percentage of total final determinations appealed by do-
mestic parties and decided in their favor is only slightly more than
the corresponding percentage for foreign appellants, as the CIT
reverses or remands a slightly greater percentage of ITA decisions
appealed by foreign producers than decisions appealed by domestic
producers.' °s
107 This table reflects 17 observations, three of which were appeals from ITA decisions,
and 14 of which were appeals from ITC determinations. This table counts appeals from the
ITA's decision not to initiate an investigation as appeals from preliminary determinations.
'0' Some caveats to this analysis need to be made, however. Some bias may not be
reflected in this examination because if foreign producers perceive bias to exist, they are less
likely to appeal questionable cases than are domestic producers. If foreign producers insti-
gate or appeal only strong cases and domestic producers appeal any case, an unbiased CIT
will reverse more often for foreign producers, rather than the roughly equal amount re-
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During the FTA negotiations, Canada did not accuse the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit of bias. The Federal Cir-
cuit, however, almost always rules in favor of the ITA or ITC,l °9
the institutions on which Canada focused most of its criticism
prior to the FTA negotiations. This tendency was illustrated in
American Lamb, in which the Federal Circuit ruled that the ITC's
method of determining material injury in the preliminary determi-
nation was preferable to that of the CIT. 1 0
In order to examine whether the Federal Circuit tends to favor
ITA and ITC determinations, regardless of the outcome of CIT de-
cisions, the antidumping and countervailing duty cases appealed to
the Federal Circuit between 1984 and 1989 were examined. The
Federal Circuit reached the same conclusion as the ITA or ITC in
31 of the 37 antidumping and countervailing duty cases appealed
to it during this time period. Nineteen of the 31 times it did so by
upholding CIT decisions that affirmed ITC or ITA decisions, but
in 12 cases the Federal Circuit overruled the CIT's reversal of the
agency decision. Only five Federal Circuit decisions affirmed the
CIT's reversal of an ITA or ITC determination, and only one re-
versed the CIT's affirmance of the lower administrative agency's
ruling. Domestic producers benefited in 27 of these appeals; foreign
producers benefited in only ten.
These data on Federal Circuit decisions are relevant in deter-
mining the effects of the FTA, as the Federal Circuit does not con-
sider cases heard by Chapter 19 panels. Furthermore, appeals from
flected in the data. Unfortunately, determining whether suits are deterred by perceptions of
unfairness is beyond the scope of this paper, so a relatively simple method of determining
bias is used.
Also, it is not always clear whether a case should be included in the calculations and, if
so, how it should be counted. Consequently, discretion was used in deciding which cases to
include in the data and, where numerous issues were raised or cross-claims made, how to
count a particular case. See note 103 for an explanation of how the calculations were made.
Examining CIT antidumping and countervailing decisions involving only Canadian pro-
ducers and exporters indicates no bias in favor of domestic appellants on the part of the
CIT. From 1984 to 1989, 42 percent of the final determinations appealed by domestic par-
ties in these cases were reversed or remanded, whereas 44 percent of those cases appealed by
Canadian interests were changed on appeal. These calculations reflect 37 observations, and
were made in the same manner as the calculations used for the tables in the text. See note
103.
'0o See Charlene Barshefsky and Michael J. Firth, International Trade Decisions of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit During the Year 1987, 37 Am U L
Rev 1167, 1168, 1183 (1988) (the authors note the extent the Federal Circuit defers to both
the CIT and the agencies responsible for administering U.S. trade laws generally, and spe-
cifically in those cases involving antidumping and countervailing duties).
"' American Lamb, 785 F2d 994.
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TABLE 3
Percentage of ITA and ITC Final Determinations Changed
on Appeal to the CIT (1984-1989)...
ITA ITC TOTAL
Year Domestica Foreignb Domestica Foreignb Domestica Foreignb
1984 0% 67% 0% 0% 0% 44%
1985 38 50 33 0 36 43
1986 50 29 0 0 45 21
1987 41 40 33 25 40 38
1988 41 41 56 33 46 39
1989 25 26 50 42 30 30
Percentage of Appealed Determinations
Changed by the CIT, 1984-1989
Total: 35% 37% 38% 27% 36% 34%
a = Percentage of decisions appealed by domestic parties changed by the
CIT.
b = Percentage of decisions appealed by foreign parties changed by the
CIT.
panel decisions to an extraordinary challenge committee are availa-
ble only where a binational panel member has violated the rules of
conduct, the panel has seriously departed from a procedural rule,
or the panel has manifestly exceeded its power, authority or juris-
diction. 112 Chapter 19 decisions are therefore less likely than CIT
decisions to be overruled in favor of an agency determination.
Given the predisposition of the Federal Circuit to rule in the agen-
cies' favor, a new system bypassing the Federal Circuit and al-
lowing only "extraordinary challenges" to Chapter 19 panel deci-
sions would benefit Canadians, if bias exists at the lower agency
level. Given the small number of cases appealed to the Federal Cir-
cuit, however, the effect of that court no longer hearing trade cases
involving Canadian producers is likely to be minor, and certainly
. This table reflects 240 observations, 182 of which were appeals from ITA decisions,
and 58 of which involved appeals from ITC determinations.
... See text accompanying notes 89-91.
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does not appear to be one considered by Canada during the negoti-
ation process.
2. Perception of Fairness.
One of the asserted advantages of the Chapter 19 panel is that
litigants will perceive it as being fairer than the CIT. This percep-
tion arguably would not only make the ITA and ITC more careful
in rendering their decisions, but would also discourage Canadians
from settling cases to their disadvantage. The softwood lumber dis-
pute is one case that may have had a different result had the
Chapter 19 panel been in place. In a preliminary investigation dur-
ing the summer of 1986, the ITA found that stumpage programs
administered by the Canadian government were countervailable
subsidies."' The ITA decision caused an uproar in Canada because
it was contrary to a 1983 ITA decision that the CIT had affirmed
concerning the same subsidy."" In late 1987, the U.S. and Canada
settled the case; consequently, a final determination was never
made, and the case never came before the CIT."' Assuming Can-
ada settled the case because it feared bias on the part of the CIT,
the existence of an authority more neutral than the CIT probably
would have reduced Canada's willingness to settle. In addition to
discouraging unwise settlements, a perception of neutrality should
also deter frivolous claims.1 6
If a perception of fairness exists, it may be only a short-term
advantage, as decisions rendered by the panel should not differ
greatly from those rendered by the CIT. Over time, the U.S. and
Canadian entities involved in trade disputes are likely to perceive
that decisions rendered by the Chapter 19 panel do not differ from
those rendered by the CIT, and eventually return to their pre-FTA
expectations and behavior.
3. Economic Analysis.
Rugman contends that the binational panel will overrule some
of the more questionable decisions and procedures of the ITA and
ITC." 7 One criticism of Rugman's position is that the panel will
... See Department of Commerce, Preliminary Affirmative Countervailing Duty Deter-
mination: Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, 51 FR 37453 (1986).
.. Department of Commerce, Final Negative Countervailing Duty Determination:
Certain Softwood Products from Canada, 48 FR 24159, aff'd by United States Coalition for
Fair Canadian Lumber Imports v United States, 5.CIT 150, 563 F Supp 838 (1983).
", Michael Howlett, 12 World Competition at 71 (cited in note 101).
11 Rugman, 40 Me L Rev at 321 (cited in note 96).
117 Id.
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have to show deference towards ITA and ITC decisions, using the
same standard of review as the CIT.1 8 Agency decisions will there-
fore continue to be affirmed routinely." 9
Furthermore, the criteria for choosing panelists include "gen-
eral familiarity with trade law," but not economic expertise.'20
Also, most members of a single panel must be attorneys.' 2' Logic
suggests that since most of the panelists will be lawyers, they will
be more expert in applying trade law than in evaluating economic
evidence. A panel that may be partially composed of trade ex-
perts-but that under the terms of the agreement must have a ma-
jority of lawyers-will probably not review ITA and ITC decisions
with more economic analysis than a judge specializing in trade
cases.
4. Predictability of Outcome.
Some commentators argue that the binational panel is an im-
provement over judicial review because the use of five panelists
rather than one judge will ensure more uniformity in the applica-
tion of Canadian and U.S. trade law. 22 This argument at first ap-
pears to have some merit, especially given Hans Zeisel's studies in-
dicating that an increase in the number of decisionmakers
increases the consistency of outcomes. 23 While Zeisel's studies
concern juries, which are not involved in the present context, they
are relevant in that they address the effect of the number of deci-
sionmakers on the consistency of decisions.
Zeisel's studies, however, involved "one-shot" players. CIT
judges are repeat players who will be replaced by ad hoc panels.
While particular panelists may serve more than once, the composi-
tion of the panels will vary. This characteristic seems to discour-
age, rather than encourage, uniformity. A judge who hears trade
cases continuously probably renders decisions consistent with his
or her other decisions. One-shot players, on the other hand, are
likely to vary in their interpretation of law and precedent. Case
law will be built, but the decisionmakers will probably be inter-
18 Free Trade Agreement, Ch 19, Art 1911, in ILM at 391-93.
" Cluchey, 40 Me L Rev at 347 (cited in note 101).
"' Free Trade Agreement, Ch 19, Annex 1901.2, 1, in ILM at 393.
"' Free Trade Agreement, Ch 19, Annex 1901.2, 2, in ILM at 393.
Gary N. Horlick, Geoffrey D. Oliver and Debra P. Steger, Dispute Resolution Mech-
anisms, in Schott & Smith, The Global Impact at 65, 70 (cited in note 100).
"' Hans Zeisel.... And Then There Were None: The Diminution of the Federal Jury,
38 U Chi L Rev 710,.717 (1971) (an empirical study finding that decisions rendered by
twelve-member juries have less variance than those rendered by six-member juries).
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preting case law created by an entirely different panel. If this sys-
tem affects the results of trade cases at all, therefore, it will proba-
bly promote inconsistency from decision to decision, rather than
uniformity. Similarly, an economist at the University of Minnesota
has expressed concern that ad hoc panels will not strive to inte-
grate their work with precedent. 24 Therefore, there is a slim
probability that outcomes will be more predictable and consistent.
Rather, the opposite effect may actually result.
5. Time and Expense of Litigation.
One possible advantage of the new panel is that it will lessen
the time and expense of U.S.-Canadian trade litigation. In addition
to limiting appeals to 315 days, the FTA provides that the home
country of the appellant will conduct the litigation, making ap-
peals much less expensive for the individual litigants.125 A quicker
appellate review process, conducted by a litigant's country, should
encourage more appeals. This advantage arguably would have
changed the outcome of the softwood lumber dispute, as the soft-
wood lumber producers might have appealed the ITA determina-
tion had there been time limitations on such appeals.' 6 Thus, if
ITA and ITC decisions tend to favor American over Canadian pro-
ducers, and if Canadians now hesitate to appeal cases as a result of
delay and expense, more favorable outcomes for Canadians could
result under the new procedures.
In sum, despite the view of Canadian politicians and academ-
ics that either exemption from U.S. trade laws or a binational
mechanism at the agency level was imperative to the signing of a
free trade agreement with the United States, Canada signed the
FTA without receiving either of these demands. The FTA directly
addresses only one of Canada's original concerns regarding the ap-
plication of U.S. trade laws-the time and expense involved in
reaching a final decision. The next section addresses the reasons
why Canada may have accepted the Chapter 19 panel provisions
despite the fact that they did not meet its initial demands.
124 Hudec, Comments at 89 (cited in note 101).
" Free Trade Agreement, Ch 19, Art 1904, 1 5, in ILM at 388. The limited time frame
directly addresses concerns Canada had prior to entering the negotiations. See text accom-
panying note 95.
" Debra P. Steger, Dispute Settlement, in Marc Gold and David Leyton-Brown, eds,
Trade-Offs on Free Trade: The Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement 182, 184 (Carswell,
1988). See Horlick, Oliver & Steger, Dispute Resolution Mechanisms at 70 (cited in note
122); John J. Quinn, A Critical Perspective on Dispute Settlement, in Gold & Leyton-
Brown, Trade-Offs on Free Trade 188, 194.
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III. THE NEGOTIATIONS REVISITED
Negotiation theory may help explain Canada's public state-
ments about the importance of a binational panel and exemption
from U.S. trade laws, the search for provisions both nations could
accept, and Canada's insistence on provisions that did not signifi-
cantly change the application of U.S. trade laws in U.S.-Canada
trade disputes.
A. Public Statements and the Search for an Agreement
According to one theory:
When national representatives go to international negoti-
ations knowing that there is a wide range of potential
agreement within which the outcome will depend on bar-
gaining, they seem often to create a bargaining position
by public statements, statements calculated to arouse a
public opinion that permits no concessions to be made. If
a binding public opinion can be cultivated, and made evi-
dent to the other side, the initial position can thereby be
made visibly "final.' ' 27
This theory suggests that the Canadian negotiators may have
overstated the importance of both Canadian exemption from U.S.
trade laws and a binational panel at the agency level. Perhaps
statements such as those made by Reisman 128 about the applica-
tion of U.S. trade laws were meant to arouse Canadian public opin-
ion and leave Canada with less- flexibility during the negotiation
process, sending a signal to the American negotiators and Congress
that, in order to finalize a trade agreement, the U.S. had to agree
to Canada's demands.
Charles Lockhart's theory regarding international conflicts
also sheds light on the FTA negotiating posture of the Canadi-
ans. 129 Lockhart recognizes an interaction between domestic and
foreign concerns that is unique to international negotiations. He
refers both to internal searches, which relate to the strategy that
will gain domestic acceptance, and external searches, which are
searches for the strategy that will gain the acceptance of the for-
eign adversary.130 Negotiators begin with an internal search, but
117 Thomas C. Schelling, An Essay on Bargaining, 46 Am Econ Rev 281, 287 (1956).
M28 See text accompanying note 65.
12, See Charles Lockhart, Bargaining in International Conflicts (Columbia University
Press, 1979).
"'o Id at 74, 77.
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when that initial strategy is unacceptable to the adversary, they
commence an external search.131
Applying this theory, when the American negotiators asserted
that the U.S. would not exempt Canada from its trade laws or re-
place the ITA and ITC with a binational panel, they rejected de-
mands based on Canada's internal search. The Canadian negotia-
tors then searched externally for an agreement the Americans
would accept, resulting in the Chapter 19 provisions.
B. Canadian Acceptance of the FTA
This analysis, however, does not completely explain Canada's
acceptance of the FTA. Even if the initial demands by Canada's
negotiating team were not as important as their public statements
indicated, they became important to the Canadian negotiators and
politicians as a result of these statements. To "lose" an issue to-
ward which so much attention had been directed would make the
Canadian negotiators look weak, both to the Canadian electorate
and to the United States. Therefore, even though Canada may
benefit under other chapters of the FTA, one may wonder why it
signed the agreement given that the American negotiators refused
both to exempt Canada from U.S. trade laws and to replace the
ITA and the ITC with a binational panel.
Lockhart maintains that some circumstances may exist where
a country will benefit from the acceptance of a one-sided settle-
ment. In 1898, for example, France entered into a one-sided agree-
ment with Great Britain regarding control of North Africa, ob-
taining a clear pathway for improved relations with Britain.132
Applying this scenario to the FTA negotiations, Canada accepted
the FTA because it included a framework for negotiating future
exemptions from U.S. trade laws 3' and enhanced relations be-
tween the two countries. This analysis could apply whether the in-
stitution of a binational panel was in fact important to the Canadi-
ans, or whether it simply gained importance as a result of the
Canadian politicians' and negotiators' public statements.
Furthermore, Canada was under pressure to reach an accord
with the U.S., regardless of the terms of the agreement. Months
before the end of the negotiation process, the Toronto bureau chief
of the Los Angeles Times, Ken Freed, guessed that Mulroney
'3' Id at 77.
..2 Id at 126-28.
133 See Free Trade Agreement, Ch 19, Art 1906, in ILM at 390.
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would accept a less-than-optimal agreement.13 Speaking at the
1987 Canada-United States Law Institute Conference, held six
months before the conclusion of the negotiations, Freed noted that
Mulroney's strategy was not necessarily to get a good trade agree-
ment, but to get re-elected. 13 5 According to Freed, Mulroney was in
political trouble, and his only hope for staying in power was the
FTA. Freed contended that "[i]f the Americans can ... allow
[Mulroney] to take some credit for something, regardless of
whatever the exact terms are, he's a winner in his view." 3' Mulro-
ney himself admitted the importance of the FTA to his political
life. After an agreement was reached, he noted he was "feeling a
little better about [his] neck.' 3 7
In a speech before the House of Commons the summer after
the negotiations, John Turner, the leader of the opposition party
in Canada, also stressed the importance of the FTA to Mulroney's
political life. Turner said the acceptance by Canada of a less-than-
optimal FTA reflected the Mulroney government's need to return
to the Canadian people with an agreement. According to Turner,
the FTA was accepted because Mulroney's government
did not have the courage or the honesty to return to the
people of Canada with a failed initiative. This Prime
Minister did not have the courage or the honesty to say
to the people of [Canada], "Well, we tried, but we
failed." The Prime Minister had too much political capi-
tal invested in getting a deal, any deal, on any terms.'38
While this statement is probably exaggerated, given the political
element involved, it does indicate that the Canadian negotiators
were under considerable pressure to bring home an agreement.
Even if Canada's acceptance of an FTA that did not incorpo-
rate its initial demands is understandable, its insistence that a
binational panel be installed despite the fact that little, if any, sub-
stantive gain was likely to result is curious. The decision to-replace
the CIT with a binational panel can be explained first by the im-
"' Ken Freed, The North American Political Outlook for the Future, 12 Can-US Law
J 165 (1987).
"' Id at 167.
'e Id at 168.
137 John F. Burns, What the Agreement Represents to Ottowa and Washington; Mul-
roney's Calculated Risks Opened Door to Settlement, NY Times D5 (Oct 5, 1987).
'38 John N. Turner, Canada Will Be Nothing More than U.S. Colony (excerpts from
Debate before the House of Commons Legislative Committee on Bill-C130, June 29, 1988),
in Canadian Speeches 8, 10 (Supp Aug/Sept 1988).
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portance of a binational panel in the eyes of the Canadian electo-
rate, and, in a related point, by tension between the demands of an
international situation and domestic factions.
Following the theory that the Canadian negotiators purpose-
fully limited their options, the public statements made by Cana-
dian policymakers prior to the FTA served to lock the negotiators
into a position they hoped would force the United States to con-
cede on the issue of trade law application. The United States re-
fused to concede, and the negotiators were left losing an issue that
they had convinced the Canadian electorate was important. It was
therefore in their self-interest to return to the electorate with a
provision that at least resembled their initial demands.
This conclusion also follows from the tension between domes-
tic and international strategies. If domestic factions are particu-
larly strong, the Chief Executive may prefer to run the risk of for-
eign, rather than domestic, disaster.139 This phenomenon could
explain why the Canadian government insisted on provisions for a
binational panel, despite the fact that Canada would receive no
substantive gain from them. While failure on the part of Canada to
reach an agreement with the U.S. would have resulted in disaster
at home, acceptance of an FTA without a binational panel may
have been worse. The Canadian negotiators, therefore, may have
opted to approve an agreement that did not really represent the
concessions Canada sought, but that on its face appeared to re-
present Canada's goals as announced to the public.
Canadians thus appear to have accepted the final terms of the
FTA as the result of both domestic and foreign pressures. The
negotiators were caught between not wanting to lose all possibility
of improved trade relations with the U.S. and not wanting to re-
turn to the Canadian electorate without a provision in the FTA at
least resembling their initial demands. For this reason, they ac-
cepted form without substance-a binational panel with little pos-
sibility of creating substantive change.
CONCLUSION
The FTA does not ameliorate most of the concerns about U.S.
trade laws expressed by Canada before and during the negotia-
tions. It does not change the ITA or ITC procedures; the U.S. still
applies its trade laws to Canada, and the new panel created by
Chapter 19 to hear appealed trade disputes must defer-as did the
139 Lockhart, Bargaining at 74 (cited -in note 129).
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CIT-to ITA and ITC decisions. Furthermore, a review of CIT de-
cisions between 1984 and 1989 indicates that no significant bias
exists at the CIT level, so there is no compelling reason for replac-
ing it with the new panel process. Any changes in trade dispute
outcomes resulting from the use of the new panel will follow only
insofar as the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which
tends to favor outcomes reached by the ITA and ITC, will no
longer decide Canadian trade cases where the litigants opt to use
the Chapter 19 procedures. Also, appeal may be more likely given
the limited time frame in which panel decisions must be rendered.
The new binational panel provisions exist because the Cana-
dian government was caught between the necessity of continuing
trade negotiations with the U.S. and returning to the Canadian
electorate with what they could call a "win." This is not to say that
Canada will not win in the long run. Its interests are probably bet-
ter served by maintaining the possibility of future negotiations
with the U.S., which possibility was preserved by the U.S.-Canada
accord represented by the FTA. Regarding the dispute-settlement
provisions, however, Canada's gains are not those claimed by her
politicians. Canada's true economic interests would have been
served just as well without the existence of Chapter 19.
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